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Equity crowdfunding, the issuance of securities through 
online platforms to an unlimited number of investors, became 
a new legal source of capital for companies beginning in May 
2016. Crowdfunding is one of several methods enacted by the 
JOBS Act through which emerging companies, or startups, can 
better access public capital. However, crowdfunding presents 
new risks to investors as many of the traditional securities law 
safeguards that protect investors are reduced or removed. 
Particularly in the biotech sector, crowdfunding investors are 
subject to increased information asymmetry, as ordinary 
individuals investing in complex scientific technologies may 
lack not only information about the company and the 
entrepreneur, but also the scientific background necessary to 
fully evaluate the technology itself. This Note analyzes the 
impact of the JOBS Act on biotech investing, focusing on the 
risks and protections available to crowdfunding investors, 
within as well as outside the bounds of the securities laws. This 
Note concludes with a proposal to integrate protections from 
FDA regulations and patent law into the crowdfunding rules.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, Elizabeth Holmes topped the Forbes list of 
America’s Richest Self-Made Women with an estimated net 
worth of $4.5 billion.1 A year later, Forbes lowered its estimate 
of Holmes’ net worth to nothing,2 and after another year, 
Holmes reportedly owed $25 million to her company 
Theranos.3 A Silicon Valley biotech startup that Holmes 
founded at age nineteen, Theranos was once valued at $9 
billion and promised to revolutionize health care.4 
 
1 See Matthew Herper, From $4.5 Billion to Nothing: Forbes Revises 




2 See id. 
3 See Anita Balakrishnan, Founder Elizabeth Holmes Reportedly Owes 
Theranos About $25 Million, CNBC (Apr. 6, 2017, 8:12 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/05/founder-elizabeth-holmes-reportedly-
owes-theranos-about-25-million.html [https://perma.cc/5JUW-L39S]. 
4 See Nick Bilton, Exclusive: How Elizabeth Holmes’s House of Cards 
Came Tumbling Down, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 2016), 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/09/elizabeth-holmes-theranos-
exclusive [https://perma.cc/A8AT-8NLM]; see also Nick Stockton, 
Everything You Need to Know About the Theranos Saga so Far, WIRED (May 
4, 2016, 8:00 AM) https://www.wired.com/2016/05/everything-need-know-
theranos-saga-far/ [https://perma.cc/2EB5-T72G]. 
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Accumulating enormous amounts of funding from private 
investors, Theranos’s technology would supposedly diagnose 
dozens of diseases with a pinprick of blood.5 However, in late 
2015, the Wall Street Journal published an article exposing 
that the device produced inaccurate diagnoses and that 
Theranos relied on another company’s traditional machines to 
run its tests.6 A series of other media outlets reported more 
issues with Theranos’s science and its business,7 eventually 
leading to formal dissolution of the company and criminal 
charges against Holmes and other executives.8 All-in-all, 
major investors in Theranos lost nearly $1 billion.9 
The rapid and highly publicized rise and fall of Holmes and 
Theranos suggested that biotech investing could suffer, with 
startups facing more skepticism or a higher burden of proof of 
potential success at the early stages of financing. Some 
emphasized how Theranos was the exception rather than the 
rule, though, pointing out an unusual disparity between the 
level of hype and the paucity of available information 
surrounding the technology, reduced regulation of diagnostics 
compared to drugs, and funding sources from venture 
capitalists less experienced in life sciences.10 Nevertheless, 
 
5 See Stockton, supra note 4. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 See John Carreyrou, Blood-Testing Firm Theranos to Dissolve, WALL 
ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2018, 12:10 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blood-testing-
firm-theranos-to-dissolve-1536115130 (on file with the Columbia Business 
Law Review). 
9 See id. 
10 See, e.g., Ben Popken, How $9 Billion Startup Theranos Blew Up and 
Laid Off 41%, NBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2017, 2:37 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/how-9-billion-blood-testing-
startup-theranos-blew-n671751 [https://perma.cc/V2RL-PP7J]; Lydia 
Ramsey, ‘The Outlier Thing Didn’t Work Out’ — Biotech CEOs Reflect on 
Theranos’ Impact on the Industry, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2017, 1:55 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/was-there-a-theranos-effect-in-biotech-
2017-1 [https://perma.cc/6YLF-ZYQM]; Randall Stross, Don’t Blame Silicon 
Valley for Theranos, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/27/opinion/dont-blame-silicon-valley-for-
theranos.html [https://perma.cc/H3PK-KMMS] (noting that life science 
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the Theranos scandal is illustrative of the challenges that 
biotech startups face in attaining financing. In biotech, 
compared to other industries, the disparity between the 
sophistication of entrepreneurs and investors can be 
especially pronounced due to the scientific and technical 
background required to understand and develop a biotech 
product. While traditional life science venture capital firms 
hire investors with M.D.s and Ph.D.s, investors without 
subject matter expertise occasionally give significant funding 
to biotech startups that may not actually be supported by 
legitimate scientific evidence.11   
Ordinary individuals now have the opportunity to inject 
capital into new biotech companies following the passage of 
the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the “JOBS Act” or 
the “Act”) in April 2012.12 The Act was designed to stimulate 
economic growth by improving access to capital for startups 
and small companies with total annual gross revenues of less 
than $1 billion, which are referred to in the Act as “emerging 
growth companies” (“EGCs”).13 Part of the capital tapped into 
by biotech startups following the passage of the JOBS Act is 
from “unaccredited investors”—ordinary individuals, as 
opposed to private equity firms and venture capitalists—who 
can now invest in startups with greater ease and without the 
traditional securities law safeguards.14 Specifically, Title III 
of the JOBS Act (the “Crowdfunding provision” or “Title III”) 
legalized the “online sale of securities to an unlimited number 
 
venture capital firms refused to invest in Theranos; those who invested in 
Theranos were not individuals with expertise in the medical and science 
fields). 
11 See Stross, supra note 10. 
12 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 
306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
13 Jesse Scott, Note, The JOBS Act: Encouraging Capital Formation 
but Not IPOs, 7 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 367, 374–75 (2014). 
14 Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 
100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 570–71 (2015); see also Brian Farnkoff, 
Crowdfunding for Biotechs: How the SEC’s Proposed Rule May Undermine 
Capital Formation for Startups, 30 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 131, 
134–35 (2013). 
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of investors (i.e.[,] a large ‘crowd’) in small amounts using the 
power of social media.”15 The Crowdfunding provision permits 
entrepreneurs to offer and sell securities without activating 
the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 
(the “Securities Act”).16 Harnessing the power of the internet 
and social media, Title III is directed at transforming 
financing for companies who otherwise would face significant 
difficulty attracting it.17 However, the Crowdfunding 
provision may allow for bad actor companies, similar to 
Theranos, to seek substantial amounts of funding from 
ordinary individuals investing through crowdfunding. In the 
biotech sector, a greater disparity in market and product 
knowledge between investors and companies, as compared to 
other industries, may expose individual investors to enhanced 
risk of fraud.  
This Note analyzes the various legal protections available 
to potential investors in “biotech startups,” a term used here 
to refer to all small companies focused on creating medical 
drugs and devices.18 Traditionally, the term “biotech 
companies” referred to companies focused on creating 
medicinal drugs with a biological (living-organism) basis, as 
opposed to pharmaceutical companies, whose drug products 
were small molecules with a chemical (synthetic) basis.19 
 
15 Farnkoff, supra note 14, at 134–35. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 133–35; see also Krystine Therriault, What Is Equity 
Crowdfunding?, CROWD CRUX, https://www.crowdcrux.com/what-is-equity-
crowdfunding/ [https://perma.cc/2RVC-4VMF]. 
18 Though Theranos is discussed throughout this Note, its product falls 
under the category of a diagnostic, instead of a medical drug or device 
referenced here by the term “biotech.” While the regulatory framework 
governing Theranos as a diagnostics company differs from that which 
governs biotech startups, see infra note 176, as a small company with a 
product in the medical field, Theranos is a relevant example showcasing 
financing issues concerning biotech startups and their investors. 
19 See Troy Segal, Biotech Vs Pharmaceutical Company, INVESTOPEDIA 
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Biotech companies were generally more focused on research 
and development, while pharmaceutical companies centered 
on manufacturing on a larger, commercial scale.20 As such, 
biotech companies faced higher costs and a greater time 
investment to develop and test a product.21 Recently, the line 
between the two industries has become increasingly blurred, 
not only in terms of the science, but also in terms of the 
competitive landscape.22 While big biotech has emerged, with 
similar traits to big pharma, this Note focuses on investment 
in smaller startup companies developing all types of medical 
drugs and devices.23  
Previous literature has discussed the potential for fraud 
through crowdfunding but has specifically focused on the 
protections set out in Title III.24 This Note argues that other 
areas of the law provide supplementary, though still 
insufficient, protection for ordinary individuals seeking to 
invest in biotech under the Crowdfunding provision. Part II of 
this Note provides a summary of the history and provisions of 
the JOBS Act. Part III describes the risks crowdfunding poses 
in exposing investors to bad actors, particularly in the biotech 
industry, and the protection measures already available 
under Title III. Part IV describes how administrative law—
through Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulations 
and approvals—and patent law serve as additional backstops 
to investor protection. Part IV demonstrates that the timing 
and public availability of FDA approval and patent 
information prevent such measures from effectively notifying 
and protecting investors. This Note concludes with a proposal 
 
20 See Hejab Azam, Pharmaceutical Vs Biotech: Chemistry vs Biology, 
PATSNAP (Jan. 12, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://blog.patsnap.com/ 
pharmaceutical-vs-biotech-chemistry-vs-biology [https://perma.cc/MXQ7-
HWG7]. 
21 See id.; Segal, supra note 19. 
22 Meghana Keshavan, Big Biotech is Here — And It’s Starting to Look 
a Lot Like Big Pharma, STAT (June 6, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/2016/06/06/big-biotech-pharma/ 
[https://perma.cc/G4RL-CDFV]. 
23 Cf. id. 
24 See generally Farnkoff, supra note 14; Ibrahim, supra note 14. 
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that biotech startups be required to disclose FDA approval 
and patent information on the investing platforms as a means 
to better protect investors against the heightened risk of fraud 
in the biotech industry. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE JOBS ACT 
A. Purpose of the JOBS Act 
To fund a new business, entrepreneurs may turn to private 
sources of capital—angel investors, venture capitalists, and 
private equity financiers—all of whom seek a high rate of 
return on their investments.25 The initial public offering (the 
“IPO”) market, as a result, is particularly important to 
startups and EGCs because it is one of three major methods 
of exit for investors, the others being merger or acquisition.26 
The IPO market offers many advantages over merger and 
acquisition (“M&A”) markets: access to capital to fund growth 
or repay debt; increased liquidity for existing owners to exit; 
and public currency to finance acquisitions.27 The IPO process 
also provides exposure and branding through media and 
analyst coverage as well as stock option benefits for current 
and future employees.28 Furthermore, going public is often 
accompanied by job creation, while M&A can lead to 
downsizing in order to eliminate redundancy.29 
However, in the two decades between 1990 and 2011, the 
ratio of IPOs to M&A exits dropped dramatically.30 Between 
2001 and 2010, seventy-five percent fewer EGCs went public 
than between 1991 and 2000, and the average age of 
companies going public was higher than during the previous 
 




29 IPO TASK FORCE, REBUILDING THE IPO ON-RAMP: PUTTING EMERGING 
COMPANIES AND THE JOB MARKET BACK ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH 1, 6 (2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/ 
rebuilding_the_ipo_on-ramp.pdf [https://perma.cc/9R6L-W995]. 
30 See id. at 7 chart E. 
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decade.31 The IPO Task Force, formed in 2011 and comprised 
of “venture capitalists, experienced CEOs, public investors, 
securities lawyers, academicians[,] and investment 
bankers,”32 identified several regulatory and market 
challenges that discouraged EGCs from going public.33 Since 
the late 1990s, a series of new rules and regulations (including 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010) required that public companies adopt more 
stringent financing and accounting systems.34 These rules 
and regulations came about in response to a series of crises 
and scandals at major public companies and constituted an 
attempt to restore confidence in the public markets.35 This 
one-size-fits-all U.S. securities regulation scheme placed 
enormous compliance costs on companies contemplating an 
IPO.36  
For EGCs in particular, compliance demanded a 
substantial proportion of the company’s earnings and lowered 
the company’s market capitalization.37 EGCs could not 
provide as much information to potential investors, making 
their stocks more difficult to understand and invest in, and 
investment banking practices thus shifted toward high-
frequency trading of large-cap stocks instead of long-term 
investing in companies.38 As a result, the IPO process became 
 
31 Id. at 6. 
32 Id. at 1. 
33 Id. at 8. 
34 Id. at 9 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 8. The regulatory theory, which argues that federal regulatory 
choices are responsible for the reduction in EGC IPOs, is considered the 
most prominent theory in this area. Other theories focus on enforcement 
(public and private litigation), market structure (economic barriers), and 
economic scope (alternative outlets) as reasons for a stunted small IPO 
market. See Paul Rose & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Where Have All the IPOs 
Gone? The Hard Life of the Small IPO, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 83, 84 (2016). 
37 IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 29, at 9. 
38 Id. 
2018.3_WU_FINAL  
1068 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
less attractive and more difficult for EGCs looking to exit their 
initial financing arrangements.39  
The IPO Task Force found that the high cost of regulatory 
compliance was the primary concern for pre- and post-IPO 
companies.40 EGCs seeking an IPO needed to be ready to take 
on these costs and build up their compliance infrastructure 
one or two years before they expected to go public.41 In order 
to reduce these regulatory costs, facilitate capital formation, 
and stimulate the dwindling U.S. IPO market, Congress 
enacted the JOBS Act with a stated goal to “increase 
American job creation and economic growth by improving 
access to the public capital markets for emerging growth 
companies.”42 The JOBS Act reduces financial statement 
disclosure requirements (Title I), removes several 
prohibitions on advertising (Title II), allows for additional 
sources of capital from individual investors (Title III), creates 
a new class of exempted securities (Title IV), and changes 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) registration 
thresholds (Titles V and VI).43 
B. Summary of JOBS Act Provisions 
The JOBS Act’s central provision is the IPO on-ramp, 
found in Title I: Reopening American Capital Markets to 
 
39 See id.  
40 Id. (citing two surveys from 2011 which found that “the average cost 
of achieving initial regulatory compliance for an IPO [was] $2.5 million, 
followed by an ongoing compliance cost, once public, of $1.5 million per 
year.”). 
41 Id. 
42 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 101, 
126 Stat. 306, 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.); see also Rose & Solomon, supra note 36, at 84–85. The JOBS Act 
was enacted primarily to reduce the federal regulatory burdens in place for 
EGCs, such as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which required 
“public company auditors to attest to and report on management’s internal 
control over financial reporting,” though it also addressed market forces by 
loosening restrictions on research analysts. Id. at 85 n.7. 
43 See Rose & Solomon, supra note 36, at 85; Scott, supra note 13, at 
374–85. 
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Emerging Growth Companies, by which Congress intended to 
ease the regulatory burden associated with going public for 
smaller companies.44 Previously, companies with a market 
capitalization of less than $75 million were exempt from a 
number of public disclosure requirements.45 However, the 
exemption was not useful for many companies considering an 
IPO, as many of these companies were high-growth and 
venture-backed with a market capitalization outside this 
range.46 Section 101 of the JOBS Act defines a new category 
of issuer, the EGC, as one with total annual gross revenues of 
less than $1 billion during its most recent fiscal year.47 The 
JOBS Act not only extends the disclosure exceptions to 
companies with a higher market capitalization, but it also 
provides a five-year qualifying limit, allowing the EGC to 
gradually ramp up reporting obligations within the five-year 
period after it goes public.48 This on-ramp reduces the 
burdensome filing and compliance requirements for a wider 
range of companies.49  
EGCs now face accounting regulations more in line with 
those faced by private companies rather than those that apply 
to public companies.50 EGCs are exempt from certain 
Sarbanes-Oxley accounting standards and from several 
financial performance and executive compensation disclosure 
requirements.51 They are not required to seek shareholder 
approval on a number of compensation-related provisions in 
 
44 See Scott, supra note 13, at 373–75. 
45 Id. at 374. 
46 Id. 
47 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 101. In 2017, the SEC 
effectuated inflation adjustments required under Title I—that the SEC 
would index for inflation every five years—and increased the revenue 
threshold from $1 billion to $1.07 billion. Inflation Adjustments and Other 
Technical Amendments Under Titles I and III of the JOBS Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 
17,545, 17,549 (Apr. 12, 2017) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 210, 227, 229, 
230, 239, 240, 249). 
48 See Scott, supra note 13, at 375. 
49 See id. at 374–75. 
50 Id. at 375. 
51 Id. at 376. 
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the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), 
which benefits founders and entrepreneurs who prefer to 
retain control over compensation after going public.52 The 
JOBS Act also facilitates communication about the EGC 
between management and potential investors, as well as with 
research analysts, during the IPO process, thus helping to 
value the company’s securities.53  
While Title I is geared toward IPOs, the remaining 
provisions of the JOBS Act are “devoted to expanding capital-
raising options for smaller, private companies.”54 Title II: 
Access to Capital for Job Creators addresses communication 
barriers, costs, and uncertainties for companies wishing to 
conduct private offerings under Rule 506 of Regulation D or 
Rule 144A.55 Rule 506 and Rule 144A offerings make up the 
majority of private market offerings, and the aggregate 
capital raised through these two methods is comparable to, if 
not greater than, that raised through the public market.56 
Title II provides a registration exemption for general 
solicitation and advertising in securities transactions under 
Rule 506 and Rule 144A.57  
 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 376–77. 
54 Tom Zanki, JOBS Act Shows Mixed Progress at 5-Year Mark, 
LAW360 (Apr. 6, 2017, 9:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/ 
articles/910544/jobs-act-shows-mixed-progress-at-5-year-mark (on file with 
the Columbia Business Law Review). 
55 See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and 
General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 
44,771, 44,787–88, 44,797–98 (Sept. 23, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
230, 239, 242).  
56 See SCOTT BAUGUESS, RACHITA GULLAPALLI & VLADIMIR IVANOV, 
CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR 
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS, 2009–2014, 7 fig.1 (2015); see also 
Scott, supra note 13, at 380 (“The importance of Regulation D offerings is 
shown by the fact that they are one of the most—if not the most—often used 
offering vehicles. Within the Regulation D exemptions, Rule 506 is the most 
prevalent. . . . The Rule 144A market also plays a key role in capital 
formation.”). 
57 Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and 
General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
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As described previously, Title III: Crowdfunding allows 
businesses to use the internet and social media to sell 
securities to a large number of people in relatively small 
amounts.58 These equity crowdfunding offerings provide  
individual investors with a share of the company’s potential 
financial returns or profits, and the offerings must fall within 
the exemption created by the JOBS Act in order to avoid 
registration with the SEC.59 Title III adds sections 4(6) and 
4A to the Securities Act and exempts transactions involving 
the offer or sale of securities by an issuer if: (1) the total 
amount sold to all investors during the preceding twelve 
months does not exceed $1 million; (2) the total amount sold 
to any single investor during the preceding twelve months 
does not exceed (a) the greater of $2000 or five percent of the 
annual income or net worth of the investor if the annual 
income or net worth of the investor is below $100,000, or (b) 
ten percent of the annual income or net worth of the investor 
if the annual income or net worth of the investor is $100,000, 
up to a maximum aggregate amount sold of $100,000; (3) the 
transaction is conducted through a broker or compliant 
 
44,773–74; see also Scott, supra note 13, at 377–80. Rule 506 provides a 
registration exemption for offerings by an issuer “not involving any public 
offering” from registration under section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act, with 
no limit on the dollar amount of securities. Eliminating the Prohibition 
Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 
144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. at 44,772–73. Section 201(a)(1) of the JOBS 
Act removes the prohibition on general solicitation and advertising in 
transactions under Rule 506, provided that the purchasers are accredited 
investors and that the issuers take reasonable steps to verify that they are. 
Id. at 44,773. Rule 144A previously only provided a registration exemption 
for securities offered to actual qualified institutional buyers under section 
4(a)(1) of the Securities Act. Id. Section 201(a)(2) of the JOBS Act amended 
Rule 144A by providing a registration exemption for securities sold, 
including through general solicitation and advertising, to all purchasers 
who the seller reasonably believes to be qualified institutional buyers. Id. 
at 44,773–74. 
58 Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387, 71,388 (May 16, 2015) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, 274). 
59 Id. at 71,389. 
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funding portal; and (4) the issuer complies with disclosure and 
other requirements.60 
The exemption requires a number of disclosures to be filed 
with the SEC, provided to investors and the intermediary 
broker or funding portal, and made available to potential 
investors.61 The disclosures include the issuer’s name, legal 
status, and physical and website addresses, as well as the 
names of the issuer’s directors, officers, and stockholders 
holding twenty percent or more of the issuer’s securities.62 
The issuer must describe its business plan, financial 
condition, intended use of proceeds, target offering amount 
and deadline, updates to reaching the target amount, price or 
method of determining price, and ownership and capital 
structure.63 Furthermore, the issuer must report its financial 
statements and operation results at least once per year to the 
SEC and investors.64  
The Crowdfunding provision restricts which types of 
issuers can benefit from the registration exemption—it 
excludes non-U.S. issuers, reporting companies, and 
investment companies.65 The SEC can also issue rules and 
regulations to disqualify categories of issuers from eligibility; 
moreover, the JOBS Act requires the SEC to disqualify parties 
from reliance on the crowdfunding exemption based on their 
 
60 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 302–
303, 126 Stat. 306, 315–21 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 15 U.S.C.). In 2017, the SEC effectuated inflation adjustments required 
under Title III, as in Title I, see supra note 47, and increased the maximum 
offering amounts and investment limits. Inflation Adjustments and Other 
Technical Amendments Under Titles I and III of the JOBS Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 
17,545, 17,549 (Apr. 12, 2017) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 210, 227, 229, 
230, 239, 240, 249). 
61 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302, 
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disciplinary history.66 In regards to advertisements and 
promotions, Title III prohibits issuers from (1) advertising the 
terms of the crowdfunding offering, except in order to direct 
investors to brokers or the funding portal, and (2) 
compensating third-party promoters, unless the promoter 
clearly discloses that the issuer is compensating it.67 
Title IV: Small Company Capital Formation directs the 
SEC to amend Regulation A and exempt certain offerings of 
up to $50 million in any twelve-month period.68 Regulation A 
previously exempted securities from most reporting 
requirements, but it was not widely used by issuers because 
the maximum amount of securities that the regulation 
permitted was quite low—$5 million in a twelve-month 
period.69 Now informally referred to as Regulation A+, the 
amended act provides another method for raising large 
amounts of capital exempt from registration requirements.70 
Section 401 of the JOBS Act amended section 18(b)(4) of the 
Securities Act to categorize compliant Regulation A+ 
securities as “covered securities,” so that state registration 
and qualification requirements are preempted if the securities 
are offered or sold on a national securities exchange or only to 
qualified purchasers.71 This expands the pool of potential 
investors.72  
Finally, Title V: Private Company Flexibility and Growth 




68 Id. at § 401; see also Scott, supra note 13, at 383; Amendments to 
Regulation A: A Small Entity Compliance Guide, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (June 18, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/ 
secg/regulation-a-amendments-secg.shtml [https://perma.cc/7CUS-NKWD]. 
69 See Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller 
Companies’ Access to Capital (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/ 
pressrelease/2015-49.html [https://perma.cc/YN63-MKJT]. 
70 See id. 
71 See Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under 
the Securities Act (Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,805, 21,856 (Apr. 20, 
2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 260). 
72 Scott, supra note 13, at 383. 
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delay or avoid becoming reporting companies by increasing 
the threshold at which issuers are required to register under 
the Exchange Act.73 “Prior to the passage of the JOBS Act, 
Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act required a company with 
more than $10 million i[n] assets and more than five hundred 
shareholders of record to register a security with the SEC.”74 
Title V raises the shareholder of record threshold from five 
hundred persons to two thousand persons, or five hundred 
persons who are not accredited investors, and it excludes 
persons who received the securities under an employee 
compensation plan from the shareholder of record 
classification.75 Title VI, in relevant part, further amends 
section 12(g) of the Exchange Act by raising the shareholder 
of record threshold for banks, bank holding companies, and 
savings and loan holding companies to two thousand 
persons.76  
C. Impact of the JOBS Act on the Biotech IPO Market 
Over the six years since Congress passed the JOBS Act, 
small companies raising capital have widely adopted the Act’s 
provisions into standard practice. However, politicians, 
businesspeople, and attorneys still debate whether the Act’s 
requirements should be further relaxed or changed due to 
concerns about fraud.77 Since Title I of the JOBS Act went into 
effect immediately after the Act’s passage, there have been 
mixed reviews as to whether the Act has actually been 
 
73 See Changes to Exchange Act Registration Requirements to 
Implement Title V and Title VI of the JOBS Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,689, 
28,689–90 (May 10, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230, 240); Changes 
to Exchange Act Registration Requirements to Implement Title V and Title 
VI of the JOBS Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (May 24, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/jobs-act-section-12g-small-
business-compliance-guide.htm [https://perma.cc/CJ47-5753]. 
74 Scott, supra note 13, at 384. 
75 Id. at 385; Changes to Exchange Act Registration Requirements to 
Implement Title V and Title VI of the JOBS Act, supra note 73. 
76 Id.; see also Scott, supra note 13, at 385. 
77 See Zanki, supra note 54. 
2018.3_WU_FINAL  
No. 3:1060] BIOTECH CROWDFUNDING 1075 
successful in measurably increasing the number of IPOs.78 In 
2014, 275 companies went public, a fourteen-year high, and 
EGCs comprised eighty-five percent of IPOs from the Act’s 
enactment through mid-2015.79 The number of IPOs per year 
slowed through 2016 and increased slightly in 2017,80 but 
EGCs remained a significant “proportion of companies pricing 
IPOs, demonstrating the lasting effect of the JOBS Act on the 
public market.”81 
Descriptive evidence of the companies going public around 
the enactment of the JOBS Act suggested that the biotech 
industry was largely responsible for the post-JOBS Act 
increase in IPOs.82 However, a study sampling IPO activity 
from January 2001 to March 2014 found that the primary 
 
78 Id. (attributing growth in IPO activity in part to market recovery 
since the recession); see also Five Years Later: Did the Jobs Act Change the 
IPO Market (or Did the IPO Market Change the Jobs Act)?, FIN. EXECUTIVES 
INT’L (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.financialexecutives.org/ 
Research/News/2017/Five-Years-Later-Did-the-Jobs-Act-Change-the-
IPO.aspx [https://perma.cc/XJ4T-Y8WP] (suggesting that if a company was 
already planning to go public, passage of the Act was neither the trigger nor 
the but-for cause of the company going public). But see Michael J. Zeidel, 
The JOBS Act: Did It Accomplish Its Goals?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 18, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/07/18/the-jobs-act-did-it-accomplish-
its-goals/ [https://perma.cc/WK43-D32V] (“EGCs taking advantage of the 
reduced regulatory requirements notably have contributed to an increase in 
the number of IPOs.”). 
79 Zeidel, supra note 78. In 2013, a year after passage of the JOBS Act, 
the number of IPOs increased from 128 in 2012 to 222, and the proceeds 
from IPOs increased from $43.9 billion to $71.9 billion. In 2014, there were 
275 IPOs accounting for $90 billion in total proceeds, the high for each figure 
for the ten-year period from 2008 to 2017. IPO Market Stats, RENAISSANCE 
CAP. [hereinafter IPO Market Stats], http://www.renaissancecapital.com/ 
IPO-Center/Stats [https://perma.cc/92MC-DNCQ]. 
80 IPO Market Stats, supra note 79. 
81 Zeidel, supra note 78. 
82 Michael Dambra, Laura Casares Field & Matthew Gustafson, The 
JOBS Act and IPO Volume: Evidence That Disclosure Costs Affect the IPO 
Decision, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 121, 122 (2015); see also Zanki, supra note 54 
(describing biotech as a “capital-hungry industry that often lacks product 
revenue and taps markets more frequently.”). 
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drivers of IPO activity after enactment of the JOBS Act were 
the reduction in proprietary disclosure costs and improved 
market conditions across industries.83 The study showed that  
favorable market trends in the biotech industry explained at 
least one-third of new biotech IPOs after enactment, whereas 
favorable market conditions in other industries could only 
account for ten percent of other industry IPOs.84 Though the 
greatest increase in IPO market volume is concentrated in the 
biotech sector, the number of offerings across industries 
remains far below the level prior to 2001.85 
The biotech sector is particularly interesting because the 
value of a company is heavily impacted by the research 
cycle.86 Along with capital formation, the financial 
performance and staying power of biotech companies are 
largely dependent on regulatory approval.87 One of the value-
maximizing strategies for biotech companies is to go public 
before being acquired by another company,88 and regulatory 
approval can be a major factor in both the company’s potential 
IPO and future M&A. While undergoing an IPO can act as a 
signal of a company’s value,89 it is not necessarily the case 
that the company will be a successful venture or that it has 
progressed along the research timeline or achieved any sort of 
regulatory approval. Furthermore, EGC is purely a securities 
law label, not an indication of a company being innovative or 
exciting or, of course, being supported by science.90 In fact, 
 
83 Dambra et al., supra note 82, at 122. 
84 Id. 
85 Id.; see also Zanki, supra note 54. 
86 The JOBS Act at Five: Examining Its Impact and Ensuring the 
Competitiveness of the U.S. Capital Markets: Hearing Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Sec. & Inv. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
115th Cong. 5 (2017) (statement of Andy Green, Managing Director, 
Economic Policy Center for American Progress) [hereinafter Statement of 
Green], https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-115-ba16-
wstate-agreen-20170322.pdf [https://perma.cc/U422-EP6D]. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
89 See Scott, supra note 13, at 368. 
90 Statement of Green, supra note 86, at 3. 
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another study found that, as of mid-2016, nearly half of EGC 
filers by assets were “real estate investment trusts, state and 
federally-chartered commercial and savings banks, and 
pharmaceutical preparations.”91  
If the relaxed regulations set forth by the JOBS Act 
incentivize companies to undergo IPOs before they are ready, 
or because they are unable to find a purchaser in the 
acquisition market, the EGC could be of lower quality from an 
investment perspective.92 The same study analyzing EGCs as 
of mid-2016 found material weaknesses in management 
reports on internal controls in forty-six percent of active EGC 
filers.93 Additionally, as the Theranos example illustrates, 
reporting issues are not the only potential problems facing 
investors. The company’s product quality, marketing, and 
overall management and strategy are all critical to an EGC’s 
survival and success. Concerns surrounding inferior biotech 
EGCs in the IPO market are magnified when analyzing the 
JOBS Act’s impact in the biotech crowdfunding market, where 
investors are both unaccredited and unsophisticated. 
III. CROWDFUNDING RISK AND PROTECTIONS  
A. Challenges for Biotech Crowdfunding 
While the JOBS Act removed certain initial challenges to 
going public, the bulk of the Act outside of Title I reduced 
obstacles to raising private capital, thus allowing companies 
 
91 Id. Note that this figure of percentage of EGC filers is lower when 
organized by revenue or number of filers. 
92 See id. at 4. 
93 Id. A material weakness exists when some flaw within the company’s 
overall control system makes it at least reasonably possible for a material 
misstatement to be included in the company’s issued financial statements 
without being corrected. Kayla J. Gillan, Bd. Member, Pub. Co. Accounting 
Oversight Bd., Remarks at Spring Meeting of the Council of Institutional 
Investors: A Layperson’s Guide to Internal Control Over Financial 
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to stay private and avoid IPOs for longer.94 In contrast to the 
IPO reforms enacted under Title I of the JOBS Act, which took 
effect immediately, Title III was not implemented until May 
2016.95 The Crowdfunding provision is regarded as the most 
novel innovation of the Act, as small businesses tapped into 
an entirely new source of capital that permitted them to raise 
up to $1 million annually in funding from unaccredited 
investors.96  
Financing in the biotech sector typically operates along a 
different timeline than in other startup areas commonly 
funded by venture capitalists, such as mobile applications or 
information technology.97 Returns on investment are often 
delayed, causing investors to retain illiquid assets for a longer 
period of time, and initial investment is more likely to be 
higher and riskier.98 The extensive time between development 
that encompasses years-long clinical trials and market entry 
for a new drug or medical device, along with the fact that 
fewer than one percent of new drugs make it to market, may 
deter venture capitalists from investing.99 The challenge that 
early-stage technologies face when moving from academia to 
market has been termed the “Valley of Death,” as some believe 
that entrepreneurs need clinical data to attract venture 
capital funding but struggle to overcome the research and 
development capital requirements.100 Others argue that the 
 
94 Zanki, supra note 54. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Farnkoff, supra note 14, at 156. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 157. 
100 Deanna Pogorelc, The Biotech Valley of Death Has Become the 
Uncrossable Canyon. Here’s One Innovative Approach to Funding, MEDCITY 
NEWS (Sept. 21, 2012, 10:42 AM), https://medcitynews.com/2012/09/the-
biotech-valley-of-death-has-become-the-uncrossable-canyon-heres-one-
innovative-approach-to-funding/?rf=1 [https://perma.cc/U3VW-YDJR]; see 
also Meg Graham, How iBio Helps Biotech Firms Through ‘Valley of Death,’ 
CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 5, 2015, 5:30 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
bluesky/originals/ct-warren-ribley-ibio-bsi-20151002-story.html (on file 
with the Columbia Business Law Review); cf. Martin Zwilling, 10 Ways for 
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“Valley of Death” is merely a representation of supply and 
demand—that early-stage biotech startups fail because there 
are too many of them or that their ideas or entrepreneurs are 
not good enough.101 Still others question whether the “Valley 
of Death” exists at all, as one study observed a greater 
proportion of Series A financings directed to biotech 
companies with drugs in the early stages of development 
compared to companies with drugs in later stages.102 Even if 
companies with early-stage drugs receive comparatively more 
funding to companies with later stage drugs, if there are more 
of the former, a perceived challenge to obtaining venture 
capital investment is possible. 
Nevertheless, the Crowdfunding provision provides an 
alternative path for investment in biotech. Low-dollar 
investors, representing an assortment of interests, may be 
less concerned about the success of the company than a 
venture capital firm that assumes a large amount of downside 
risk for each investment.103 In addition to being less risk 
averse, these low-dollar investors may be more attracted to 
the humanitarian goal of the EGC and more patient with the 
return on investment.104 Crowdfunding issuers may include 
charitable foundations or individuals with personal stories 
and social media acumen that can inspire others to invest in 
 
Startups to Survive the Valley of Death, FORBES (Feb. 18, 2013, 11:30 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/martinzwilling/2013/02/18/10-ways-for-
startups-to-survive-the-valley-of-death/#20ef08a869ef 
[https://perma.cc/5J6J-AAMK] (describing the “Valley of Death” term as 
applied to startups generally). 
101 Brandon Glenn, In Biotech, the Popular Valley of Death Meme is 




102 Bruce Booth, Where Does All That Biotech Venture Capital Go?, 
FORBES (Feb. 9, 2015, 10:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/brucebooth/2015/02/09/where-does-all-that-biotech-venture-capital-
go/#6deaa7de4676 [https://perma.cc/2FVB-BZPW]. 
103 Farnkoff, supra note 14, at 157. 
104 Id. at 158–59. 
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a venture that could take a long time to pay off.105 Spreading 
out the investment among investors with different incentives 
and perhaps less risk aversion to invest in biotech can help 
EGCs cross the “Valley of Death.”106 
While crowdfunding may offer a financing solution for 
biotech startups, many are concerned that even with low-
dollar investments, unaccredited investors will be subject to 
heightened risk and losses resulting from fraud and self-
dealing.107 In the 1980s, small offering exemptions under Rule 
504 resulted in widespread abuse through penny stock 
securities fraud.108 Without federal mandatory disclosure or 
state registration requirements, bad actors issued up to $1 
million of securities in New York to favored groups.109 The bad 
actor issuers then artificially drove up prices in the secondary 
market so that the favored initial investors could sell at a 
profit and new investors were left with inflated shares, 
leading to a substantial loss as the shares inevitably 
declined.110 Combining the internet and social media with the 
relaxed regulations and oversight could lead to scams at an 
even greater scale, as bad actors are provided with new 
opportunities to influence potential investors.111 In the 
biotech sector specifically, investors’ risks are magnified as 
issuers promising cures of rare diseases “may attract a more 
vulnerable subset of unsophisticated investors who are more 
 
105 Id. at 159–60. 
106 Id. 
107 See Devin Thorpe, Worries About Fraud Top List of Crowdfunding 
Concerns, FORBES (Nov. 29, 2017, 9:46 PM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/devinthorpe/2017/11/29/worries-about-fraud-top-list-of-crowdfunding-
concerns/#7749d9ad48f0 [https://perma.cc/B65S-6WYM]; cf. Drew Prindle, 
Don’t Get Burned! How to Back Crowdfunding Projects the Smart Way, 
DIGITAL TRENDS (Aug. 12, 2018, 8:14 AM), 
https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/crowdfunding-tips-avoid-scams-
kickstarter-indiegogo/ [https://perma.cc/2LYE-LBUS]. 
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willing to part with their money for a good cause.”112 The 
unaccredited investor discovering the opportunity to invest in 
a biotech startup will not be able to conduct the rigorous due 
diligence that venture capital firms, and healthcare venture 
capital firms in particular, are trained to perform.  
Typical venture capital firms and angel investors utilize a 
variety of tools to mitigate risks when investing in startups. 
Venture capital firms conduct staged financing through 
detailed investment contracts.113 Venture capitalists and 
angel investors may release money over time, and only when 
the startup achieves certain pre-set milestones.114 They 
screen startups in person, sometimes multiple times, and they 
either are or employ individuals with technical expertise in 
the field.115 The in-person contact not only weeds out low-
quality ventures, but also creates a bond of trust that can 
encourage productive disclosure.116 Venture capital firms, in 
addition to engaging in staged financing, will “take preferred 
stock with liquidation preferences in exchange for their 
investments, which signals the entrepreneur’s belief that the 
startup will be worth more than these preferences.”117 
Venture capitalists also frequently take board positions in the 
startup, and angel investors will similarly visit and engage 
with the startups they fund.118 By taking a corporate 
governance role either formally or informally post-
investment, as well as by taking numerous measures to 
research and contract before making an investment, venture 
capital firms and angel investors are better able to reduce the 
agency costs that result from asymmetrical information and 
extreme levels of uncertainty during the initial stages of 
startup financing.119  
 
112 Id. at 162. 
113 Ibrahim, supra note 14, at 574. 
114 Id. 
115 See id. at 575–76. 
116 See id. at 576. 
117 Id. at 574. 
118 Id. at 575–76. 
119 Id. at 574, 576. 
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Crowdfunding investors cannot employ the mixture of 
screens used by angel investors and venture capital firms 
prior to or during the investment period. Instead, 
crowdfunding investors may rely only on information directly 
available on the intermediary’s platform or notices directing 
the investor to the funding portal or broker.120 The JOBS Act 
prohibits the issuer from advertising “the terms of the 
offering, except for notices which direct investors to the 
funding portal or broker.”121 Thus, any advertising made 
through a communication channel other than directly on the 
intermediary’s platform must be limited to these notices, 
which can include no more than a statement that the issuer is 
conducting a crowdfunding offering, the name of the 
intermediary, a link directing the investor to the 
intermediary’s platform, the terms of the offering (defined as 
the nature, price, and amount of the securities offered and the 
closing date of the offering period), and narrow factual 
information about the legal identity and business location of 
the issuer.122 The SEC’s limitation on advertising was 
intended in part to protect investors by “directing them to the 
intermediary’s platform where they can access the disclosures 
necessary for them to make informed investment 
decisions.”123 
These disclosures, discussed infra Section IV.A, may be 
insufficient for crowdfunding investors in the biotech 
sector.124 Instead of the product’s scientific and technical 
information, which would be carefully reviewed by potential 
angel investors and venture capital firms, these mandatory 
crowdfunding disclosures focus primarily on the offering itself 
 
120 See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,387, 71,424–25 (May 16, 2015) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, 274). 
121 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(2) (2012). 
122 See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,424–25; see also 17 C.F.R. § 
227.204 (2015).  
123 See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,425. 
124 See infra text accompanying notes 173–175; see also supra notes 61–
64 and accompanying text. 
2018.3_WU_FINAL  
No. 3:1060] BIOTECH CROWDFUNDING 1083 
and the financial condition of the issuer.125 A crowdfunding 
issuer can “communicate other information that might occur 
in the ordinary course of its operations and that does not refer 
to the terms of the offering” without violating the advertising 
prohibition.126 However, this permitted factual business 
information carries risks to biotech crowdfunding investors 
because it can also be incomplete, misleading, or even 
fraudulent. 
B. Crowdfunding Investor Limits 
To reduce the potential harms to investors, the 
Crowdfunding provision anticipated several protective 
measures aimed at keeping individual investment at low 
dollar amounts. The statute provides a “single-issuer 
investment limit,” a limit on how much investors can invest in 
a single venture, and an “aggregate investment limit” that 
requires intermediaries to ensure that investors do not exceed 
their limits among all ventures.127 The single-issuer 
investment limit is defined as a proportion or maximum dollar 
amount of the investor’s annual income or net worth.128 If any 
one investor exceeds this amount with any one issuer, the 
issuer loses its registration exemption.129 On the other hand, 
the registration exemption is not conditioned on all investors 
staying within their aggregate investment limit; instead, the 
statute demands that the intermediary make efforts to ensure 
that investors do not exceed the aggregate investment 
limit.130 Issuers who have accepted funding from investors 
who have exceeded their aggregate investment limit thus do 
not lose their exemption, as long as those investors’ 
 
125 See infra text accompanying notes 173–175. 
126 See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,425. 
127 Farnkoff, supra note 14, at 163. 
128 Id. at 165. 
129 Id. at 166. 
130 Id. 
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intermediaries have taken steps, undefined in the statute, to 
prevent the investors from exceeding their limits.131 
Because intermediaries may be brokers or merely online 
funding portals,132 the current measures they can use to 
ensure an investor’s compliance with either the single-issuer 
or aggregate investment limits are based on the investor’s own 
representations.133 Where the intermediary otherwise 
complies with the statute––including ensuring that the 
investor confirms understanding of the educational 
information required by the SEC and answers questions 
demonstrating that he or she understands the level of risk and 
illiquidity generally applicable to investments in startups and 
small issuers––the intermediary has a reasonable basis for 
believing that the investor satisfies the investor 
limitations.134 Unless the issuer otherwise knows that the 
investor is unqualified to make the investment, the issuer and 
intermediary are both protected from liability, and the issuer 
can retain its exemption.135  
The SEC found this self-verification standard satisfactory 
because of the hardship intermediaries would face by 
monitoring and independently verifying whether investors 
would stay within their investment limits.136 However, this 
 
131 Id. 
132 Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for 
Crowdfunding Intermediaries, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
[hereinafter Regulation Crowdfunding], https://www.sec.gov/divisions/ 
marketreg/tmcompliance/cfintermediaryguide.htm [https://perma.cc/T6RD-
75QD] (last modified May 13, 2016). 
133 Farnkoff, supra note 14, at 167. 
134 Id. at 168; see also Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 132. 
135 Farnkoff, supra note 14, at 168. The issuer will lose “the 
crowdfunding exemption for the entire equity or debt offering in the event 
that an intermediary fails to adequately ensure that a lone investor stays 
within his aggregate investment limit.” Id. at 176. The intermediary is 
responsible for tracking the investments an investor makes with that same 
intermediary to ensure the investor does not exceed its limits, but the 
intermediary is not responsible for tracking the investor’s investments 
outside of the intermediary’s own systems. Id. 
136 Id. at 168. 
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hands-off approach to compliance shifts risk away from 
intermediaries and issuers, and it relies on unaccredited and 
unsophisticated investors to protect their own interests.137 
Optimistic crowdfunding investors may attempt to maximize 
their investment and thus their hopeful return by 
misrepresenting their net worth, annual income, or aggregate 
crowdfunding investment levels.138 While the JOBS Act 
legislators may have intended to tap into this optimism to 
help solve financing problems for startups, they left the door 
open to overinvestment and to the subsequent risk of 
overexposure to bad actors. 
As the statute stands now, if the intermediary finds that 
an investor has reached his or her aggregate investment cap 
and prevents the investor from further investing, the investor 
could theoretically open an account at another intermediary 
and invest his or her entire cap amount there. There are 
plenty of intermediaries an investor can choose from—as of 
November 1, 2018, there were forty-seven funding portals and 
hundreds of broker-dealers who are members of the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority, registered with the SEC, and 
allowed to engage in crowdfunding as intermediaries.139 The 
second intermediary would be bound by the same diligence 
requirements, but as noted above, the investigation standard 
is not high as long as the intermediary has a reasonable basis 
to believe the investor is being truthful.   
To address this issue, the SEC could create and operate a 
system containing verifiable proof of investor income, net 
worth, and investments with crowdfunding intermediaries.140 
In the payday lending area, for example, some states require 
lenders to check a centralized database, containing records of 
all lending, in order to keep people from exceeding aggregate 
 
137 See id. at 171. 
138 Id. at 175. 
139 Funding Portals We Regulate, FIN. INDUS. REG.  AUTH. (Nov. 1, 
2018), https://www.finra.org/about/funding-portals-we-regulate 
[https://perma.cc/L9GR-FV6D]. 
140 Farnkoff, supra note 14, at 177–78. 
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borrowing limits by shifting lenders.141 Creating a similar 
crowdfunding database could be cost-prohibitive, though, and 
may raise privacy concerns that may trouble investors. The 
SEC has explored, but thus far rejected, the idea.142  
While a centralized system operated by the government 
could be expensive, with costs borne by taxpayers and 
investors alike, the creation of third-party verification 
systems in the private sector could potentially reduce costs, 
both to the public and overall.143 Private third parties could 
compete for the business of intermediaries, but the 
competitors would still need to share specific investment 
information, such as which investors are working with which 
intermediaries and how much each person is investing.144 If 
the third parties were to request self-verification information 
from the investors (as intermediaries do now), the same 
problems facing intermediaries would be transferred to the 
third parties. Furthermore, in informationally asymmetric 
markets, a monopoly is likely to arise, thus not actually 
reducing the costs associated with a federally controlled 
system.145 
Though crowdfunding may not currently be able to take 
advantage of these other corporate law-based solutions for 
investor protection, biotech crowdfunding can tap into 
additional sources of legal protection. FDA approval 
requirements and patent law greatly influence and attempt to 
guard interests of both biotech consumers and companies. By 
 
141 See, e.g., Kim Chandler, Supreme Court Upholds Payday Loan 
Database, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2015),  
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/27/supreme-court-
upholds-payday-loan-database/ [https://perma.cc/LMB4-Y4QU]; Riley 
Snyder, Audit Finds Nearly a Third of Nevada Payday Lenders Violated 




142 Farnkoff, supra note 14, at 179. 
143 Id. at 180. 
144 Id. 
145 See id. 
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including disclosure relating to these two areas within the 
current disclosure requirements under Title III, crowdfunding 
investors can become better informed of the nature of the 
investment and better protected against bad actor issuers.  
C. Liability of Issuers and Intermediaries 
Though not a preventative protection, investors have a 
private cause of action against an issuer for consideration or 
damages if the issuer makes a misleading statement of 
material fact, by either making an untrue statement or 
omitting a material fact.146 But due to restrictions on 
individual investment amounts, most crowdfunding plaintiffs 
may not have a strong incentive to sue on their own, instead 
likely relying on class action suits against potentially 
fraudulent issuers.147  
Section 302 of the JOBS Act creates liability for issuers 
analogous to section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, with section 
12(b), loss causation, and section 13, statute of limitations, of 
the Securities Act attaching to liability as well.148 Issuers can 
avoid liability under section 12(a)(2) if they can prove they did 
not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have 
known, of the material misrepresentation or omission.149 
Additional defenses include that the investor knew of the 
misinformation150 or that it did not cause depreciation in the 
value of the security.151 Investors also have a cause of action 
under section 10 of the Exchange Act for a violation of Rule 
10b-5, but, among other elements, the investor must prove 
scienter.152   
 
146 Id. at 170; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1.  
147 Sherief Morsy, Note, The JOBS Act and Crowdfunding: How 
Narrowing the Secondary Market Handicaps Fraud Plaintiffs, 79 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1373, 1385 (2014). 
148 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77l–77m (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 77d-
1 (2012). 
149 See Morsy, supra note 147, at 1386. 
150 17 C.F.R. § 230.159 (2005). 
151 See Morsy, supra note 147, at 1386. 
152 Id. at 1387–88. 
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Identifying the issuer in a crowdfunding offering for the 
purposes of liability presents an additional challenge. Because 
entrepreneurs engaged in crowdfunding are by definition 
small companies, they may not have the resources to defend 
against a class action lawsuit. The companies may only 
consist of one or a few people, who use the funds raised 
immediately to cover operating costs or research and 
development. The statute defines issuers as:  
[A]ny person who is a director or partner of the issuer, 
and the principal executive officer or officers, principal 
financial officer, and controller or principal accounting 
officer of the issuer (and any person occupying a 
similar status or performing a similar function) that 
offers or sells a security in a transaction exempted by 
the provisions of section 4(6), and any person who 
offers or sells the security in such offering.153 
Under this definition, the SEC believes that an 
intermediary, including a funding portal, could be considered 
an issuer for the purposes of liability.154 The investor would 
have a cause of action against the intermediary if the startup 
made materially false statements and the intermediary 
merely passed them along in the offering to the investor.155 
The SEC suggests that if the original issuer––the startup––
was available, the intermediary would not be jointly liable. 
Rather, the investor could bring action against the 
intermediary only if the original issuer was judgment-proof––
for example, if the original issuer disappeared with the 
investor’s money after making materially false statements.156 
However, the SEC still does retain the reasonable belief 
standard for liability, such that an intermediary would only 
be subject to liability for a materially false statement 
propagated through the intermediary if the intermediary 
 
153 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302, 
126 Stat. 306, 319 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
154 Farnkoff, supra note 14, at 170. 
155 See id. 
156 See id. 
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failed to conduct an adequate review of the original issuer’s 
statements.157  
The statute is also vague as to what constitutes reasonable 
or sufficient review by the intermediary as to the issuer’s 
statements and background. The Crowdfunding provision, in 
addition to requiring the intermediary to ensure that 
investors do not breach their single-issuer or aggregate 
investment limits, requires the intermediary to “take 
measures to reduce the risk of fraud, including background 
and securities enforcement regulatory checks on the officers, 
directors and 20% shareholders of each issuer whose 
securities it offers and any other requirements the SEC 
adopts.”158 The timing and substantiality of the background 
and regulatory history checks on the issuer are not described 
in the statute. The intermediary may only be required to 
conduct one background check before listing the issuer on the 
funding portal.159  
In any startup, the entrepreneur knows more than 
potential investors, who typically have no prior background 
knowledge of the entrepreneur to consider. Furthermore, the 
entrepreneur has an incentive to portray the venture as new 
and revolutionary, or at least as an improvement on existing 
options, in order to attract financing. The Theranos scandal is 
a prime example of how information asymmetry and market 
uncertainty can be greatly exacerbated when the 
entrepreneur takes active steps to obscure her technology—
pitching empty promises to revolutionize the medical field—
and investors are unsophisticated in the technological area. 
Though secrecy and hype are not unique in a startup’s early 
days,160 the dangers can be too great to rely on liability as a 
 
157 See id. 
158 JOBS Act: Crowdfunding Summary, PRACTICAL L. CORP. & SEC., 
Oct. 23, 2013, Practical Law Practice Note 6-518-7396.  
159 Ibrahim, supra note 14, at 605. 
160 See Issie Lapowsky, Theranos’ Scandal Exposes the Problem with 
Tech’s Hype Cycle, WIRED (Oct. 15, 2015, 3:33 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/10/theranos-scandal-exposes-the-problem-
with-techs-hype-cycle/ [https://perma.cc/7HZP-2C4A] (“grandiose promises 
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deterrent for issuers or solution for investors. Especially in the 
biotech sector, which directly implicates individuals’ medical 
treatment,161 the legal framework should take affirmative 
steps to prevent harm to investors and consumers alike. 
IV. SUPPLMENTARY SOURCES OF INVESTOR 
PROTECTION FROM PATENT AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  
A. Mandatory Disclosure Under Title III 
Scholars have debated whether investor protection should 
be the central goal of securities regulation.162 Some argue that 
the objective of securities law should be the maximization of 
social welfare and that the best way to achieve that objective 
is through regulations aimed at encouraging investment by 
sophisticated institutional investors.163 Discouraging 
individual investing has the potential to decrease the costs 
borne by issuers and the regulatory bodies that enforce 
compliance with the securities laws.164 However, others argue 
that individual investing, regardless of the sophistication of 
investors, can produce efficiency benefits by providing an 
important source of liquidity.165 Despite the academic debate 
 
are table stakes in the tech industry, a requirement for luring both investors 
and early users. And typically, they’re harmless.”). 
161 See id. (comparing the fallout from Holmes’s actions to promises 
made by executives at Facebook, Uber, and Tinder that their products would 
become global networks at the early stages of financing). 
162 See Colleen Honigsberg, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Yu-Ting Forester 
Wong, Mandatory Disclosure and Individual Investors: Evidence from the 
JOBS Act, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 293, 299–300 (2015) (describing several 
perspectives on whether the securities laws should encourage individual 
investor participation). 
163 Id. at 299 (citing Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The 
Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711 (2006)). 
164 Id. (citing Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation, 47 J. 
ACCT. RES. 391, 417 (2009)). 
165 Id. (citing Ron Kaniel et al., Individual Investor Trading and Stock 
Returns, 63 J. FIN. 273, 274 (2008); Qin Wang & Jun Zhang, Individual 
2018.3_WU_FINAL  
No. 3:1060] BIOTECH CROWDFUNDING 1091 
over what the securities laws should aspire to achieve, 
policymakers have consistently focused on individual investor 
protection as a principal regulatory objective.166 
In order to protect and provide individual investors with 
equal access to securities markets, mandatory disclosure rules 
have become the cornerstone of federal securities law.167 
Whether mandatory disclosure actually achieves these goals 
of protection and access for individual investors is another 
point of academic debate—one side argues that disclosure 
facilitates individual investor participation by reducing 
information asymmetry among different types of investors, 
while the other suggests that additional disclosure does not 
benefit individual investors, who are already overloaded with 
information and unable to extract relevant information from 
complex securities filings.168 A study collecting and analyzing 
empirical evidence around the IPO stage demonstrated that 
“reducing the information that firms are required to disclose 
before an IPO leads to a statistically and economically 
significant decrease in individual investor participation in the 
IPO. Importantly, however, this effect is substantially 
reduced during the week of trading following the IPO—and 
disappears completely after two weeks.”169 The authors found 
that “individual investors who are at an informational 
disadvantage to other investors will be less likely to 
participate in securities markets.”170 Mandating disclosure 
 
Investor Trading and Stock Liquidity, 45 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 
485, 486 (2015)). 
166 Id. at 300. 
167 Id. at 295. 
168 Id. (citing, for example, Brian J. Bushee et al., Open Versus Closed 
Conference Calls: The Determinants and Effects of Broadening Access to 
Disclosure, 34 J. ACCT. & ECON. 149 (2003); Alastair Lawrence, Individual 
Investors and Financial Disclosure, 56 J. ACCT. & ECON. 130 (2013); Brian 
P. Miller, The Effects of Reporting Complexity on Small and Large Investor 
Trading, 85 ACCT. REV. 2107 (2010)). 
169 Id. at 296. 
170 Id. at 296. 
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can address this disadvantage but is “not the only mechanism 
available to address these information asymmetries.”171 
As described supra Section III.B, the Crowdfunding 
provision primarily focuses on investor protection by 
requiring the intermediary to ensure the investor does not 
invest beyond his or her means.172 The burden is placed on the 
intermediary not only to verify the investor’s activity, but also 
to ensure that the issuer is credible. In contrast to 
intermediary enforcement, increasing issuer transparency 
and disclosure is another option to protect crowdfunding 
investors. Section 302 of the JOBS Act mandates certain 
issuer disclosures, but the disclosures are mainly descriptive 
of the issuer’s current financial condition and intended uses 
for the funds to be raised.173 Ownership and capital structure 
disclosures describe the securities themselves, their 
valuation, and the risks to “purchasers of the securities 
relating to minority ownership in the issuer and future 
corporate actions, including additional share issuances, a sale 
of the issuer or transactions with related parties.”174  
Missing from the disclosure requirements, however, are 
any details of the actual achievements and potential success 
of the venture.  Because this kind of information might occur 
in the ordinary course of business, entrepreneurs can 
communicate it with the public through social media or other 
means outside of the intermediary’s platform, without 
violating the advertising prohibition, so long as the 
communication does not refer to the terms of the offering.175 
While entrepreneurs may be incentivized to disclose this 
information in order to attract funding, fear of competitors 
appropriating any disclosures could nonetheless drive 
entrepreneurs to stay silent. Startups, often not advised by 
 
171 Id. at 297. 
172 See supra text accompanying notes 127–138. 
173 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302, 
126 Stat. 306, 315–21 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.); see also supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text. 
174 JOBS Act: Crowdfunding Summary, supra note 158. 
175 See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71, 387, 71,424–25 (May 16, 2015) 
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, 274). 
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legal counsel, may also withhold this information for fear of 
liability attaching when disclosing certain positive or forward-
looking information without appropriately disclosing the 
associated risks. Lastly, instances of issuer fraud, such as 
Theranos, show that veils of secrecy and public hype are 
enough to draw substantial funding without open and honest 
disclosure. 
This Note proposes that biotech crowdfunding, with its 
unique challenges of obtaining investment alongside 
regulatory approval and heightened information asymmetry, 
utilize other areas of the law outside of securities law to better 
protect investors. Mandating disclosure of FDA and patent 
milestones on the intermediary’s platform can provide easily 
understandable and accessible information to unsophisticated 
investors and help them make more informed decisions prior 
to investment. By hosting this information on the 
intermediary’s platform, all issuer disclosures are provided in 
a centralized location viewable to anyone seeking to invest in 
the offering. Further, limiting disclosure to checkboxes and 
brief explanations and disclaimers noting whether milestones 
were achieved can reduce the potential for disclosure overload 
as well as misleading hype. 
B. Disclosure Requirements Relating to FDA 
Approvals   
The success of biotech ventures is distinctive compared to 
companies in other industries, as it not only depends on 
market interest and uptake, but is also highly contingent on 
regulatory approval. While the need for approval can serve as 
the main reason why many ventures fail, regulations not only 
protect the public from harmful or inaccurate products, but 
also signal to potential investors the quality and probability 
of commercial success. Developers of both medical drugs and 
devices must reach clear goalposts before their products can 
reach consumers, and they can and should disclose their 
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progress along the way.176 This Subsection provides an 
overview of the many FDA regulations that a biotech startup 
must surmount, the prospects and success of which should be 
disclosed to potential investors through the intermediary 
broker or funding portal.  
The FDA is the primary regulatory authority for both 
medical drugs and devices, and it sets out milestones 
governing development from pure laboratory research to 
consumers’ hands.177 For medical drugs, FDA review begins 
 
176 Though outside the scope of this Note, it is important to recognize 
that the regulatory framework governing companies that manufacture 
diagnostic tests (such as Theranos) is distinguishable from the regulatory 
framework governing biotech startups that produce drugs and devices. 
Diagnostics companies can avoid submitting their product to the FDA before 
bringing the test to market through a regulatory loophole for laboratory 
developed tests (“LDTs”). See Arielle Duhaime-Ross, Theranos Isn’t the Only 
Diagnostics Company Exploiting Regulatory Loopholes, VERGE (Nov. 11, 
2015, 8:28 AM) https://www.theverge.com/science/2015/11/11/9706356/fda-
theranos-health-diagnostics-cancer-tests-regulation-loophole-ldt 
[https://perma.cc/F7U3-D84H]; see also Laboratory Developed Tests, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/ 
productsandmedicalprocedures/invitrodiagnostics/laboratorydevelopedtest
s/default.htm [https://perma.cc/MU6T-42GG]. This loophole allows any 
company that develops and conducts a diagnostic test in its own laboratory 
to use the test on real patients without having to first submit to the FDA. 
See id. While the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) 
regulates laboratories and the quality of laboratory testing, it does not 
review tests for safety and effectiveness of patient treatment and diagnosis, 
as that falls under the FDA’s purview. Clinical Laboratory Improvement 
Amendments (CLIA), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Sept. 19, 
2018), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/ 
index.html?redirect=/CLIA [https://perma.cc/YS69-8TKC]; CLIA 
Overview…, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct. 22, 2013), 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/ 
Downloads/LDT-and-CLIA_FAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9MC-X79E]. 
Arguments for closing this loophole, as well as improving the relationship 
between the FDA and CMS as related to oversight of laboratory testing and 
diagnostic devices, are especially of interest in the wake of the Theranos 
scandal, but this Note is limited to considering the FDA regulation of 
medical drugs and devices only. 
177 The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and 
Effective, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ 
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once the researchers have submitted an investigational new 
drug application (“IND”).178 The IND must demonstrate that 
the drug is ready for human testing by showing the results of 
preclinical animal testing and proposing trial protocols for 
human testing.179 Both the FDA and a local institutional 
review board, a panel composed of scientists and non-
scientists in hospitals and research institutions who oversee 
clinical research procedures and ethics, must approve the IND 
before clinical testing in humans can begin.180 Submission of 
the IND should be the first qualification a biotech developing 
a drug should disclose to potential investors. 
Once the IND is approved, the three phases of clinical 
studies can begin.181 In Phase I, researchers test the drug in 
healthy volunteers to determine the drug’s side effects and 
how it is metabolized and excreted.182 Phase II studies can 
only begin if the researchers determine in Phase I that the 
drug is safe.183 Phase II analyzes the effectiveness of the drug 
in treating people with a certain disease or condition, while 
researchers still monitor the safety of the drug in both the 
control and experimental groups.184 If the trials continue to 
show that the drug is safe, as well as effective in Phase II, the 
FDA and the company or institution responsible for the drug 
meet to determine how Phase III large-scale trials should be 
conducted.185 Phase III trials test different dosages of the drug 
on different populations, in combination with other drugs, in 
at least several hundred and up to several thousand 
individuals.186 A biotech company should have to disclose to 
 
ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143534.htm [https://perma.cc/BS22-
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potential investors (through the intermediary) which clinical 
phase its drug is in, as well as provide updates to current 
investors through annual reports of operations and financial 
statements, as already required by Title III.  
If the drug successfully makes it through the three phases 
of clinical testing, the company or institution responsible for 
the drug must then submit a formal new drug application 
(“NDA”).187 The NDA includes “all animal and human data 
and analyses of the data, as well as information about how the 
drug behaves in the body and how it is manufactured.”188 
After the FDA receives the NDA, the FDA has sixty days to 
decide whether to file the application for review or reject it for 
being incomplete.189 The FDA’s expected timeline for 
reviewing and acting on NDAs is between six and ten months 
after the applications are received, depending on if the drug is 
classified as a standard or priority drug.190 Even after 
approval, the FDA conducts “postmarket requirement and 
commitment studies to gather additional information about a 
product’s safety, efficacy, or optimal use.”191 The submission 
and pending status of the NDA are both incredibly useful 
indicators of the likelihood that a product will make it to 
market, and thus they should be disclosed to potential and 
current investors through the intermediary and annual 
updates. 
The regulatory burden to get a drug to market is 
cumbersome and lengthy, with each clinical phase potentially 
lasting several years,192 but the path to approval is clear and 
well-known. Even among those not in the industry, people at 
least recognize the value of FDA approval and have some 
knowledge of clinical trial phases as indications of safety and 
effectiveness. As such, presentation of these signals is useful 
for individuals searching for a biotech company in which to 
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companies engaged in crowdfunding aimed at remedying an 
illness or disease. Mandatory disclosure of FDA regulatory 
status makes clear which startups are not seeking FDA 
approval, either because they will not have the clinical data to 
support the safety and effectiveness of the drug or because the 
product does not actually qualify as a drug (and may therefore 
be exempt). In such cases, the startup can nonetheless provide 
its reason for not submitting the IND, the first stage of FDA 
regulatory approval. Disclosure could occur through a 
checklist on the funding portal, listing the regulatory stages 
in checkboxes with additional spaces provided for status 
updates or explanation. The disclosure should also include 
descriptions and disclaimers about what each stage means 
and its general probative value to the investment. 
While the preceding discussion outlined the steps for 
regulatory approval of a medical drug, the FDA also regulates 
medical devices according to three regulatory classes—
Classes I, II, and III—determined by the devices’ “intended 
use and the degree of risk they pose to the public.”193 All 
manufacturers and initial distributors of medical devices 
must register their place of business with the FDA, and most 
are “required to list the devices that are made there and the 
activities that are performed on those devices.”194 In addition 
to registering the business and listing the device, 
manufacturers of Class III devices must obtain premarket 
approval (“PMA”), the FDA’s scientific and regulatory review 
process evaluating safety and effectiveness of devices that 
support or sustain human life, prevent impairment of human 
health, or present possible unreasonable risk of illness or 
injury.195 PMA is the most stringent regulatory requirement 
 
193 Sarah Y. Kwon, Note, Regulating Personalized Medicine, 31 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 931, 937 (2016). 
194 Device Registration and Listing, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationand 
Guidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice/RegistrationandListing/default.htm 
[https://perma.cc/MA3D-D8F7] (last updated Sept. 27, 2018). 
195 Premarket Approval (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/ 
2018.3_WU_FINAL  
1098 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
for medical devices,196 and it involves both analytical and 
clinical validation—ensuring that the laboratory test can 
accurately identify a sample (analytical validation) and can 
correctly link the sample to a specific disease or clinical action 
(clinical validation).197 Regulations provide 180 days for the 
FDA to make a determination, though in practice the review 
process may take longer.198 The review process can include a 
public meeting with an FDA advisory committee providing 
recommendations, and after the FDA notifies the applicant of 
its decision, a notice is published on the internet announcing 
the data underlying the decision and the process by which 
interested persons can petition for reconsideration.199 
FDA review of the PMA is required before Class III devices 
may be marketed, but other regulatory mechanisms are still 
in place for less risky medical devices.200 Those who desire to 
market other medical devices intended for human use—Class 
I, II, or III devices exempted from PMA—must submit a 
premarket notification 510(k) to the FDA.201 The 510(k) 
submission must demonstrate that the device is substantially 
equivalent to—at least as safe and effective as—a legally 
marketed device, and before the device can be marketed, the 
FDA must find it to be so and provide an order clearing the 
device for commercial distribution.202 The PMA and 510(k) 
measures are protections for consumers that can be utilized 
for investor protection as well, if made readily available 
 
HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketApprovalPMA
/default.htm [https://perma.cc/NRF3-2DUQ] (last updated Sept. 27, 2018). 
196 Id. 
197 Kwon, supra note 193, at 938. 
198 Premarket Approval (PMA), supra note 195. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Premarket Notification 510(k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/ 
HowtoMarketYourDevice/PremarketSubmissions/PremarketNotification5
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through the investment platform through a similar checkbox 
with explanation format.  
For example, when first launched in 2007, the DNA 
testing-by-mail service 23andMe was lauded in the biotech 
sector—receiving a similar initial reaction as Theranos—as a 
transformative technology that allowed individuals to obtain 
a complete DNA report of health, hereditary traits, and 
ancestry.203 But in 2013, the FDA imposed a moratorium on 
marketing the test by constraining it as a diagnostic device 
subject to the Class III stringent PMA validation 
standards.204 The FDA warning and restriction on 23andMe’s 
marketing (which would extend until it had undergone the 
necessary approvals) proved to be surmountable, though, as 
23andMe has since undergone another round of funding upon 
receiving approval.205 The FDA lifted the moratorium in April 
2017, after reviewing data “through the de novo premarket 
review pathway, a regulatory pathway for novel, low-to-
moderate-risk devices that are not substantially equivalent to 
an already legally marketed device.”206 “The decision is 
expected to open the floodgates for more direct-to-consumer 
 
203 See, e.g., Larry Downes & Paul Nunes, Regulating 23andMe Won’t 
Stop the New Age of Genetic Testing, WIRED (Jan. 1, 2014, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2014/01/the-fda-may-win-the-battle-this-holiday-
season-but-23andme-will-win-the-war/ [https://perma.cc/7E9D-EF62]. 
204  Julia Belluz, In an Amazing Turnaround, 23andMe Wins FDA 
Approval for Its Genetic Tests, VOX (Apr. 6, 2017, 1:19 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/2017/4/6/15207604/23andme-wins-fda-approval-for-
its-genetic-tests [https://perma.cc/8RPQ-YKSQ]; Downes & Nunes, supra 
note 203; Gina Kolata, F.D.A. Will Allow 23andMe to Sell Genetic Tests for 
Disease Risk to Consumers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/health/fda-genetic-tests-
23andme.html [https://perma.cc/BV2L-JU9R]; see also Lapowsky, supra 
note 160. 
205 Lapowsky, supra note 160. 
206 Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Allows Marketing of 
First Direct-to-Consumer Tests that Provide Genetic Risk Information for 
Certain Conditions (Apr. 6, 2017) [hereinafter FDA Allows Marketing of 
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tests for disease risks, drawing a road map for other 
companies to do the same thing.”207 Additional tests based on 
the same technology submitted by 23andMe or other 
manufacturers will not have to undergo the same review, but 
instead will qualify for the less rigorous 510(k) premarket 
notification requirement.208 While regulatory approval can 
halt marketing, worthwhile companies will ultimately be able 
to surmount the capital and timing barriers, supported by 
investors who know that the company is intending to achieve, 
rather than avoid, FDA approval.  
C. Patent Disclosure in Crowdfunding   
Patent law also has a particularly pronounced effect on 
biotech over other types of technology. In electronics and 
software, the value of patent protection may be minimal given 
that innovation and the development timeline to get a product 
to market are so fast-paced that patents are easily 
circumvented. However, a patent is crucial to the commercial 
success of a biotech company, where developing and launching 
a product is much more time and resource intensive due in 
part to the research cycle and need for regulatory approval. 
Obtaining a patent on a medical drug or device provides a 
monopoly for a defined market sector—or specific disease 
indication—for a limited period of time and can lead to 
enormous profits. One of the primary goals of the patent 
system, in providing this monopoly, is the dissemination of 
technical information—allowing skilled artisans to innovate 
and learn from knowledge of the technical details of the 
invention. 
 A patent can also be used to advertise and promote useful 
embodiments of the invention to those not skilled in the art, 
such as investors,209 whether through disclosure of 
 
207 Kolata, supra note 204. 
208 FDA Allows Marketing of First Direct-to-Consumer Tests, supra 
note 206. 
209 J. Jonas Anderson, Nontechnical Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 
1574–75 (2016). 
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nontechnical information within the patent itself or simply 
through notifying individuals that a patent is pending or has 
been issued.210 While these forms of nontechnical information 
do not meet patent law’s statutory written description and 
enablement requirements,211 they “can be highly useful and 
valuable to individuals seeking information about the 
technology,” signaling to other innovators, consumers, and 
investors the potential value of the inventive idea.212 A 
venture capitalist, for example, may not understand all the 
science behind a company’s portfolio of biotech inventions, but 
whether these products are patented can inform the investor’s 
decision and help to estimate the company’s value and future 
market share.213 As such, entrepreneurs seeking 
crowdfunding should be required to disclose if a patent 
application will be filed—and if so, its application status—to 
potential investors through the intermediary broker or 
funding portal.  
Unlike disclosure of a product’s status within the FDA’s 
regulatory approval process, though, disclosure of patent 
nontechnical information may be more likely to mislead 
investors because the (potential) existence of a patent can 
mistakenly convince unsophisticated individuals that the 
product is innovative, when the patent may actually be invalid 
or the invention technically useless.214 Furthermore, many 
inventions may not qualify for patent protection, for reasons 
entirely unrelated to whether or not the company would be a 
good investment. For the same reasons that nontechnical 
disclosure can be valuable for investors, it can also present 
 
210 Id. at 1591 (“Indeed, nontechnical disclosure is more about the 
existence of a patent than what the patented invention covers.”). 
211 A valid patent must “contain a written description of the invention” 
and “the manner and process of making it and using it” so that “any person 
skilled in the art. . . [can] make and use” the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) 
(2012). 
212 Anderson, supra note 209, at 1575. 
213 Id. at 1591. 
214 Id. at 1576. 
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great risk, especially in crowdfunding, as it is aimed at 
persons unskilled both in the technical art and in investing.215 
 In order to avoid vague or misleading information, the 
proposed disclosure requirements should provide checkboxes 
as to whether a patent has been filed and issued, with 
disclaimers as to reasons why a patent may not be filed as well 
as the probative value of patents generally on commercial 
success. Nontechnical disclosure that a patent exists provides 
another data point that the investor can use in deciding 
whether or not to invest in a company. This could potentially 
incentivize the investor to research more about the product’s 
technical specifications while reducing the risk of material 
misinformation. As a backstop, Title III provides investors 
with a cause of action against a company that makes a 
misleading statement of material fact,216 which investors can 
utilize when an entrepreneur misuses nontechnical patent 
disclosure. 
V. CONCLUSION  
The JOBS Act, likely in conjunction with other market 
factors, has seemingly invigorated the biotech investment 
market. While the enactment of Title III in May 2016 has 
raised concerns about investor protection across industries, 
biotech crowdfunding presents unique challenges to issuers, 
intermediaries, and investors. This Note has presented a 
wide-ranging description of the various protections available 
to potential biotech investors from bad actors, focusing on the 
crowdfunding protections currently set out in Title III and 
those provided by the FDA’s regulatory authority and patent 
law. However, unless information as to a product’s safety, 
effectiveness, and patentability is properly and timely 
disclosed, unsophisticated investors will likely not be able to 
distinguish good biotech investments from bad ones and could 
be convinced to overinvest due to potentially unmerited 
optimism in the venture.  
 
215 See id. at 1577. 
216 Farnkoff, supra note 14, at 170. 
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This Note proposes that biotech startups seeking 
crowdfunding should be required to disclose if they are 
seeking regulatory approval and where they are in the FDA 
approval process. If they are not seeking FDA approval, they 
should be required to disclose why they have chosen not to 
seek it. Similarly, the startup should be required to disclose 
whether a patent has been filed or issued. With more 
expansive disclosure requirements, investors will be better 
able to screen and make informed decisions as to the quality 
of the venture in which they are considering investing. 
Disclosure through the intermediary and a checkbox with 
explanation format can minimize the risk of disclosure 
overload for the unsophisticated investor. In biotech, FDA 
regulations and patent law already serve to protect consumers 
and innovators. By integrating these areas into the JOBS Act, 
they can help protect investors as well.  
